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800 years ago, in June and November of 1215, two great events 
took place that have shaped our imaginations about law, reform, 
and constitutional and individual rights to the present day:  The 
meeting of King John of England with the magnates of his realm 
on the fields of Runnymede and the great church council in 
which the prelates of the Church gathered around Pope Innocent 
III in the papal basilica San Giovanni in Laterano were focused 
on the the great issues of the time.  Both meeting produced 
documents that have been interpreted by scholars, read by 
students, and debated by everyone. 
 By 1215 King John had lost almost all of his northern 
continental possessions.  The core of the Angevin empire, 
Normandy, was lost.  Anglo-French barons who still held lands 
in Normandy owed their primary allegiance to King Phillip 
Augustus, not to King John.  The barons and churchmen who 
remained under his sovereignty chaffed under his rule.  It is clear 
from the document that the barons forced John to sign when they 
met with John on Runnymede in 15 July 2015, they intended to 
impose reform on the king.  We might sum up their objectives as 
being the administration of justice and defending their customary 
rights in what remained of the John’s kingdom. 
 Magna Carta was a major event in King John’s reign.  
Because the archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton, played 
such a significant role in the affair that took place on 
Runnymede, scholars have wondered about the connections 
canon law and its jurisprudence embedded in the Ius commune 
might have had in the minds of those who drafted the document.1  
1 For a recent continental view of Stephen Langton’s relationship to the barons 
and to Magna Carta see Daniel Baumann, Stephen Langton: Erzbischof von 
Caterbury im England der Magna Carta (1207-1228) (Studies in Medieval 
and Reformation Traditions 144; Leiden-Boston 2009) 159-189; John W. 
Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton, Future Archbishop of Canterbury: The 
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A larger question is the relationship of the Ius commune to 
English common law in the early stages of its development.  
Charles Donahue wanted to have a word to illustrate the 
relationship.  He chose ‘influence’.  Twenty-five years ago he 
wrote:2 
We need a word to tie the ius commune to the common law of 
England.  The standard word is ‘influence’, and the standard meaning 
of the word is direct borrowing of rules and sometimes broader 
principles. 
That may seem as if it would be a statement that would evoke 
little controversy in the world of legal history.  Nevertheless, it 
has.  Scholarly attempts to explore the ‘influences’ that the 
jurisprudence of the Ius commune might have had on English 
common law and Magna Carta have been met with criticism, 
some of it rather pointed.3  In this essay I will examine possible 
‘influences’ that the Ius commune may have had on Magna Carta 
and the relationship and possible connections between the two 
most significant reform assemblies in the early thirteenth 
century: the king, prelates, and barons who gathered at 
Runnymede and the pope, cardinals, bishops, abbots, and clergy 
who congregated in San Giovanni in Laterano. 
 I begin at a strange place, neither in England nor in 
Rome, but in Rouen, France.  A manuscript resides there that 
dates to the early thirteenth century and belonged to the lepers’ 
hospital of Saint Gilles in the Norman city of Pont-Audemer.   It 
contains documents related to the hospital and its founding but 
also contains the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council and cheek 
by jowl a French translation of Magna Carta.4  James Clarke 
Paris Schools and Magna Carta’, EHR 123 (2008) 811-846, especially 834-
835.. 
2 Charles Donahue,  Jr. ‘Ius commune, Canon Law, and the Common Law in 
England’, Tulane Law Review 66  (1991-1992) 1745-1780 at 1747. 
3 Richard H. Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta and the ius commune’, The University 
of Chicago Law Review 66 (1999) 297-370. 
4 Simone C. Mesmin (later MacDougall), The Leper Hospital of Saint Gilles 
de Pont-Audemer : An Edition of its Cartulary and an Examination of the 
Problem of Leprosy in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries (Ph. D. 
dissertation, 2 volumes, University of Reading 1978) has given a detailed 
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Holt had examined the cartulary and published an edition of the 
French text in 1974.5  Holt tried to explain why Magna Carta 
was translated into French and why a copy of it found its way 
into a cartulary of a small foundation in Normandy. He noted that 
the manuscript copy of Magna Carta had the text of a writ 
addressed to the sheriff of Hampshire appended to it.6   The writ 
instructed the sheriff to compel people to obey the twenty five 
barons who had been designated by the charter to enforce its 
provisions.7 Bishop of Winchester, Peter des Roches was 
appointed the sheriff of Hamsphire in 1216.8 
 Bishop Peter had an unusually interesting career.  Born in 
Touraine he rose from being the archdeacon in the diocese of 
Poitiers to become Lord Chamberlain under Richard the 
Lionheart, then was elected to the see of Winchester  in 1205.  
King John chose him to be chief justice of the realm in 1213.9  
He was a stubborn supporter of the king and fiercely loyal to 
him.  In the Spring or Summer of 1215 Innocent sent a letter to 
Bishop Peter in which the pope told the bishop that he should 
prevent his court from hearing suits’ belonging in secular courts.  
He also informed him that he would promulgate rules at the 
description of the cartulary and translated the documents.  She has also edited 
other related documents from the archives. 
5 James C. Holt, ‘A Vernacular-French Text of Magna Carta, 1215’,  The 
English Historical Review 89 (1974) 346-364.  The text had been printed 
before in early modern editions.  French translations of three coronation 
charters of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II in British Library, Harley 458, fol. 
4r-4v deserve scholarly scrutiny (my thanks to Jennifer Jahner for this 
information); see images at 
http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/laws/manuscripts/hl/?nb=3191&tp=s 
and the rather unsatisfactory images in James C. Holt, Magna Carta (3rd ed. 
Cambridge 2015) between 234-235. 
6 Ibid. 464: ‘Johan par la grace de Deu reis d’Engleterre al viconte de 
Suthantesire’. 
7 Ibid. 348. 
8 Nicholas Vincent, Peter des Roches: An Alien in English Politics, 1205-1238 
(Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 4th series, 31; Cambridge 
1996). 
9 Vincent, Peter des Roches 89-113. 
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upcoming council about the issue.10  Innocent also mentioned 
that he asked John to send proctors to the council to defend his 
rights. 
 Holt argued that the translation of Magna Carta and the 
writ delivered to Odiham must have been drafted in Hampshire 
and that the translation was made for publication there.11  
Odiham was a secure royal fortress, and its ruins are still known 
today as ‘King John’s castle’.  He spent time there before and 
after Runnymede.12   However, John met Stephen Langton at 
Winchester on 20-21 July 1215.13  The Latin version of the writ 
was that sent to all the sheriffs of England on the 27th June from 
Winchester.14  The last line of the French writ states that John 
witnessed the writ at Odiham on 27 June 1215.  Odiham is ca. 25 
miles from Winchester.  John could have been in both places on 
the same day.  Holt does not consider the possibility that a Latin 
and French version of the writ might have been sent at the same 
time to the sheriffs of the realm and that the French translation 
was a product of chancery scribes in Winchester.15   
10 Paris, BNF lat. 11867, fol. 37vb-38ra.The Latin text is printed and 
translated in Selected Letters of Pope Innocent III concerning England (1198-
1216), edd. Christopher R. Cheney and W.H. Semple (Nelson’s Medieval 
Texts; London-Edinburgh-Paris-Melbourne-Toronto-New York 1953) 205-
206, which was based on the earlier edition of  Karl Hampe, ‘Aus verlorenen 
Registerbänden der Päpste Innocenz III. und Innocenz IV.’ MIÖG 23 (1902) 
545-67 at 556-557. 
11 Holt, ‘Vernacular-French Text’ 348. 
12 J.C. Holt, Magna Carta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) 
154-155 and (3rd ed.) 214-215. 
13 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’ 827. 
14 Ibid. 347 for the Latin text. 
15 In the new and augmented edition of Holt’s Magna Carta edited and 
prepared by George Garnett and John Hudson (3rd ed. Cambridge 2015), 
appendix 7 deals with the French translations.  It does not discuss the possible 
place where the translation was made or its transmission.  The different scripts 
in the French translations of the coronation oaths of Henry I, Stephen, and 
Henry II found in British Library, Harley 458, fol. 4r-4v are dated to the same 
period.  I am not sure that is correct.  An analysis of the French translation’s 
language might resolve some of the problems.  For the importance of Henry 
I’s coronation oath, see Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’ 828. 
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 A larger question is how many copies of Magna Carta 
and its French translations were sent out.  We know that Master 
Elias of Dereham, who was a first-rate administrator, played a 
significant role in the distribution of the Latin text of Magna 
Carta.  Vincent has described how he may have accompanied 
Archbishop Stephen Langton to Runnymede and then was given 
the task of distributing four copies of Magna Carta.  One month 
later Elias was given six more copies of the text to deliver.16  
That much we know.  There were probably more people involved 
in the Charter’s distribution.17  The translation in Rouen must 
have been done and circulated about the same time.  Thirteen 
bishops and twenty abbots witnessed the Charter.  In their 
European-wide, ecclesiastical realm it was standard practice that 
significant legislation was distributed widely.  A comparison to 
the legislation of the Fourth Lateran Council is instructive.  Even 
though the canons were almost immediately incorporated into 
canonical collections that were taught in the schools and used in 
the courts, the canons circulated widely as separate texts.  There 
are twenty manuscripts in all.18   Although we cannot know how 
the circulation of the canons was organized, we can tell from the 
manuscript evidence that they were all produced by professional 
scribes in scriptoria.  In some cases they were produced with 
great care and elegantly decorated.19  One might presume that the 
bishops at Runnymede would have wanted the document that 
they witnessed to be distributed similarly.  Their chanceries had 
the means to do so. 
16 Nicholas Vincent, ‘Master Elias of Dereham (d.1245): A Reassessment’,  
The Church and Learning in later Medieval Society: Essays in Honour of R.B. 
Dobson, edd. Caroline M. Barron and Jenny Stratford (Harlaxton Medieval 
Studies11; Donnington 2002) 128-159 at 141. 
17 As Vincent as observed in the Times Literary Supplement February 20, 
2015 there may be charters yet to be discovered whose circulation has left no 
trace in the records.  He also points out that later charters were circulated 
systematically.  My thanks to Richard Helmholz for this citation. 
18 Antonio García y García, Constitutiones Concilii quarti Lateranensis una 
cum Commentariis glossatorum (MIC Series A 2;  Città del Vaticano 1981) 
21-31; seven were English. 
19 E.g. Lisbon, BN 173 (Alcobaça CCCIV), fol. 1ra-9vb; García, 
Constitutiones 25-26. 
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 Peter des Roches surrounded himself with Frenchmen in 
his episcopal household.20  He had the bureaucracy in 
Winchester with the means to produce and send out these 
documents.21  Even more significantly, Winchester had the most 
talented scribes and professional scriptoria in England.  The 
Winchester Bible that was produced in the second half of the 
twelfth century and the Cotton Psalter now in the British Library 
bear witness to a scriptorium of great sophistication even before 
Peter des Roches’ arrival.22  Winchester also had a tradition of 
translating Latin texts into French.  The Cotton Psalter is a 
remarkable example of the talent of translators in Winchester 
(presumably) before the translator of Magna Carta.23  The 
Psalter’s alternating columns of Latin and an excellent French 
translation is evidence of flourishing tradition.24  A study of its 
French in comparison to the French Magna Carta might prove 
illuminating.25 
 If the French translation of Magna Carta and the writ is a 
sole survivor of many that were sent out, then undoubtedly the 
Winchester chancery would have followed the practice of the 
papal chancery.  Each individual charter would have been 
20 Vincent, Peter des Roches 32-41. 
21 For translations in England of texts from the vernacular into Latin and Latin 
into the vernacular, see Bruce R. O’Brien, Reversing Babel: Translation 
among the English during an Age of Conquests, c. 800 to c. 1200 (Newark 
2011). 
22 Claire Donovan, The Winchester Bible (Winchester 1993), based on the 
meticulous and brilliant sensitivity to style of Walter Oakeshott, The Artists of 
the Winchester Bible (London 1945) 3. 
23 London BL Cotton Nero C.IV.  The entire manuscript can be viewed in 
great detail at: 
http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=cotton_ms_nero_c_iv_fs001r  
24 Some art historians are no longer certain that the psalter can be connected to 
Winchester; see Frances Carey, The Apocalypse and the Shape of things to 
Come (Toronto 1999) 70, with bibliography. 
25 Ursula Nilgen has examined the Winchester Psalter; see her ‘Psalter für 
Gelehrte und Ungelehrte im hohen Mittelalter’, The Illuminated Psalter: 
Studies in the Content, Purpose and Placement of its Images, ed. Frank Olaf 
Büttner (Turnhout 2004) 239-247 and 510-513, as well as her other works.  
She has summarized her studies in LMA 9 (2002) 227-228, with bibliography. 
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individually addressed.26  In any case, the scribe misspelled 
Odiham in the last line of the writ,, which was corrected in the 
Rouen manuscript.  The scribal error of misspelling Odiham 
would be good evidence the writ was not drafted there.  A home 
town scribe would not have made such an elementary mistake. A 
further consideration in thinking about the writs’ origins might 
be that Odiham would have been an unlikely place to have found 
a highly skilled translator.  The household of Peter des Roches in 
Winchester with its entourage of continental clerics would have 
had translators who were up to the task.  The reader should be 
warned, however, that I may be pressing the evidence further 
than is warranted.  
 Holt recognized the translator’s skill translating Latin into 
French, but the translation is far from ‘mechanical’.27   I would 
note that he had quite remarkable skill translating Latin legal 
terms into French.28    The three chapters dealing with legal 
procedure are very adroitly rendered, even better in some small 
ways than the Latin version.  Chapter 38 states: 29 
<38> Nuls bailliz ne mette des ci en avant alcun a lei par sa simple 
parole, fors par bons tesmoinz amenez a ice (Nullus ballivus ponat 
decetero aliquem ad legem simplici loquela sua, sine testibus 
fidelibus ad hoc inductis).  From this time forward no bailiff shall 
bring anyone to court on just his authority alone, unless good 
witnesses provide evidence. 
Richard Helmholz has noted that the Latin text makes use of the 
language of the Ius commune with the word ‘testis’ rather than 
‘sectatores’ that would be more fitting for English common law. 
30  The Latin text employs an unusual adjective: ‘testibus 
fidelibus’.  No text of the Ius commune called for ‘faithful’, or 
26 Holt, ‘French Vernacular Magna Carta’ 348: ‘all the evidence suggests that 
the translation was done to facilitate the publication of the Charter in 
Hampshire .  .  . the translation must have been made from the original letters’. 
27 Holt, ‘French Vernacular Magna Carta’ 350. 
28 We might also compare the translation to the other English translations of 
legal texts and a legal glossary, see O’Brien, Reversing Babel 125 and 164. 
29 My translations of chapters 38, 39, and 40 are taken from Holt, Magna 
Carta 327 (3rd ed.) 389. 
30 Richard H. Helmholz, ‘Magna carta and the ius commune’, The University 
of Chicago Law Review 66 (1999) 297-371 at 337. 
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the more usual meaning ‘Christian’, witnesses.  At the Fourth 
Lateran Council that was held in November of 1215, canon eight 
dealt with exactly the same issue: who could convince a 
magistrate and give him the authority to summon a defendant to 
court without an accuser?  The conciliar canon’s answer was that 
repeated information from prudent and honest persons (providus 
et honestus) would give magistrates jurisdiction.31  Writing 
shortly after 1215 Tancred of Bologna noted that if the witnesses 
who brought information to the attention of the magistrate were  
to be ‘good and eminent/important’ (bonus et gravis).32  ‘Boni 
testes’ or ‘idonei testes’ became the standard language used by 
the jurists to describe the qualities of witnesses in legal 
proceedings of all types.33  In any case the translator understood 
that the Latin ‘fidelis’ was misleading and equivocal.  It could 
mean a Christian or simply a faithful person.  In either case it 
was not a legal term and did not define the proper credentials that 
a witness should have.   He translated ‘fidelis’ as ‘bon’.  The 
same term used by the Ius commune. 
 Undoubtedly the most famous chapter in the charter is 39.  
It is of great consequence historically because formidable 
structures of legal due process and constitutional government 
have been built upon its words over the centuries, whether such 
buildings had solidity or not.   
<39> Nuls frans hom ne sera pris, ne emprisonez, ne dessaisiz, ne 
ullagiez, ne eissilliez, ne destruiz en aucune maniere, ne sor lui 
n'irons ne n'enveierons, fors par leal jugement de ses pers, o par la lei 
de la terre (Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur aut 
disseisiatur aut utlagetur aut exuletur aut aliquot modo destruatur, nec 
31 Chapter 4 of Magna Carta has this language ‘duobus legalibus et discretis 
hominibus’, which the French translator rendered ‘a deus leals prodes homes’.  
‘Prod’ means ‘prudent’.  In this case ‘discretus’ conforms more closely to the 
language of the jurists in the Ius commune than ‘prod (prudentis)’.  ‘Prudentis’ 
was most often was used to describe a judge not a witness. 
32 153-154 ‘Verumtamen fama precedere debet inquisitionem, non semel, set 
sepe, et apud bonos et graves procedure debet; aliter non debet fieri inquisitio, 
sicut expresse habetur,  extra de accusat. Qualiter et quando (X 5.1.3)’, 
collated with Paris, BNF lat. 4366B, fol. 29vb.  
33 E.g. Bernardus Parmensis, Glossa ordinaria to X 2.19.5 s.v. testium.  Many 
more examples could be given. 
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super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale iudicium 
parium suorum vel per legem terre). 
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or desseised or 
outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we move nor 
send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or 
by the law of the land. 
It also has the most intriguing phrase of the whole document, 
‘legale iudicium’, normally translated ‘legal judgment’, which is 
accurate and most likely correct.  What makes the phrase 
intriguing is the question, what is not a legal ‘iudicium?’  A 
‘iudicium’ was the Latin term, taken from Roman law and 
incorporated into canon law, for a trial or (more rarely) a 
courtroom.  A ‘legale iudicium’ is a tautology; every ‘iudicium’ 
is ‘legale’.   Although a legal judgment makes sense in modern 
English, a non-legal ‘iudicium’ is a concept that does not exist in 
the Ius commune.  A jurist of the Ius commune would have 
smiled indulgently at the formulation. 
The phrase had roots in the continental ‘iura propria’.  As 
far as I can tell, for a short time during the Carolingian period the 
term ‘legale iudicium’ was used to describe certain legal 
decisions.  One of the most famous was the ‘legale iudicium’ of 
Charles the Bald’s bishops when they excommunicated Baldwin 
for carrying off Charles’ daughter Judith and marrying her, 
willingly or not.34  Our French translator rendered the phrase 
‘leal jugement’.  ‘Leal’ normally meant ‘loyal’, but a number of 
texts repeat the French translator’s ‘leal jugement’, meaning 
‘legal judgment’.35  These texts, however, gives us no evidence 
34 Janet L. Nelson, Charles the Bald (Medieval World; London 1992) 203.  
See also Carpenter, Magna Carta 250-253 on the European usage of judgment 
by peers; also Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the 
Middle Ages (London 1961) 162-163. 
35 I am thankful that Jennifer Jahner provided me with more information about 
the use of ‘leal’ in Anglo-Norman texts:  ‘Leal has a wide semantic range. 
Like continental French, it carries a primary meaning of ‘loyal’, but it also has 
closely affiliated secondary meanings of ‘true, ‘law-abiding’, and ‘legal’. In 
the romance traditions (cf. Chrétien de Troyes, Boeve de Hamptoun, Tristan), 
it denotes a knight of exemplary trustworthiness, and this sense seems to carry 
over to (or borrow from) the judicial realm, where a ‘leal hume’ is an oath-
helper or a faithful witness. The most salient example comes from the Leis 
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what a ‘legal judgment’ was.  If we turn to literature, we do find 
the term used in poems composed about Aymeri of Narbonne,36 
William Marshal,37 and the old trickster Reynard the Fox.38  
These poems were all written in the twelfth or early thirteenth 
centuries.  Although the texts attest that the French translator was 
not mechanically translating ‘legale iudicium’, they do not shed 
light on what a ‘legale iudicium’ or ‘leal jugement’ might have 
been at the time of Magna Carta.  It does show that the translator 
knew that the drafters of Magna Carta translated ‘leal jugement’ 
into Latin.  In other words, the terminology is taken from secular 
trial practices and modes of proof. 
 What modes of proof did the barons demand the right to 
have?39  A trial by their peers.  But what were they rejecting?  
Willelme (early to mid-twelfth century), caps. 14-16 (see Felix Liebermann, 
Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, 1: Text und Übersetzung (Halle an der Saale 
1903) 502-503). In c.15.1, the writer refers to ‘leals humes’ as oath-helpers or 
witnesses during ordeals. The translator of the Latin version, the Leges 
Willelmi, renders this phrase ‘legales homines’. It seems that this notion of 
‘leal’ can slide relatively easily from describing the man capable of rendering 
testimony to the act of peer judgment’.  See the entries in the online Anglo-
Norman Dictionary at http://www.anglo-norman.net/. 
36 Lines 2584-2586: ‘S’or n’en fet Charles le los de ses amis Et le leal 
jugement de Paris, Ja des vasaux n’en estordra uns vis’, Les Narbonnais: 
Chanson de geste, ed. Hermann Suchier, Les Narbonnais:  Chanson de Geste 
(2 vols. Paris 1898) 1.97. 
37 Lines 13084-13087: ‘Quer unques ne fui desleials, Quer cil malveisement 
s’escuse Qui leal jugement refuse. Isi avint la Mar’.  L’histoire de Guillaume 
le maréchal, comte de Striguil et de Pembroke, ed. Paul Meyer (2 vols. Paris 
1894) 2.107.  The translation of these lines ‘For I was never false; the man 
who refuses a fair trial puts up a poor defence of his case’, is not satisfactory, 
e.g. History of William Marshall: Text and Translation, trans. A.J. Holden  (3 
vols; Occasional Publications 4 and 5; London 2002-2006) 2.155. 
38 Lines 1233-1238:  ‘Sire, fet Renart, entendez. Jugement de moi entendez. 
Au jugement me contendrai Et vostre merci atandrai.  Onques ne fu nul 
homme ne Sanz leal jugement mene’, Le roman des Renart: Les branches 
additionellés,  ed. Ernest Martin, (Vol. 2; Strasbourg: K.J. Trübner, 1885) 230. 
39 I do not find H. Summerson’s analysis of the modes of proof in c.39 
convincing: H. Summerson, 'The 1215 Magna Carta: Clause 39, Academic 
commentary', The Magna Carta Project: 
 
 [http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/magna_carta_1215/Clause_39?com=a
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The answer to that question might come from a rather surprising 
source: the ius proprium of the privileges of the twelfth-century 
emperors.  These imperial privileges offer evidence that the 
issues that brought the barons and King John to Runnymede had 
resonated widely in Europe during the twelfth century.  A 
standard, boiler plate clause was inserted into imperial privileges 
that granted the recipients the right to vindicate their rights either 
by an ordeal or by a ‘legale iudicium’.  Emperor Conrad II 
(1027-1039) granted Bishop Hiltulfus and his successors 
imperial protection of ecclesiastical property in 1037:40 
We grant to Bishop Hiltulfus that advocates which he would have 
selected .  .  . that no public magistrate may presume to demand 
anything from them, so that they may more diligently pursue the 
legal problems of the church either through the ordeal or through 
‘legale iudicium’. 
Privileges from emperors Henry III, Henry IV, and Frederick I 
Barbarossa repeated the same clauses word for word in their 
privileges.41  This clause was repeated in imperial privileges for 
over a century.  Could the meaning and the terminology of 
‘legale iudicium’ have crossed the Channel?  I do not think it 
impossible, even if I cannot give a source.  However, the 
ca  accessed 15 August 2015]: ‘But the presentation of judgment and law as 
alternatives, which to present-day eyes appears to be making a distinction 
between verdict and sentence, is arguably more apparent than real.  The text is 
in fact speaking of judgment rather than proof, but the two formed inseparable 
parts of a single process, and Clause 39 must have been concerned with 
both’.   
40 Conradi II. Diplomata (MGH, DD 4; Hannover 1909; reprinted Munich: 
1980) p. 322, line 7-11: ‘Concedimus autem eidem Hiltulfo episcopo 
advocatos quoscumque elegerit tam de suis quam de alienis liberis hominibus, 
qui eiusdem rerum utilitates episcopi exerceant, ita ut ab omni rei public•  
functione sint absoluti, nil ab eis quisquam publicus minister exigere 
presumat, ut securius ac diligentius causas ipsius •cclesi•  perficere possint 
sive per pugnam sive per legale Iudicium;’ noted by Ullmann, Principles 162-
163.  Herwig Wolfram, Konrad II, 990-1039: Kaiser drei Reiche (Munich 
2000; English translation, University Park 2010) 129.  
41 Die Urkunden Heinrichs III. 1039-1047, H. Bresslau (MGH, Die Urkunden 
der deutschen Könige und Kaiser 5.1; Berlin 1926) 167 lines 10-14; 
Diplomata Heinrici IV, ed. D. von Gladiss (MGH, DD 6.2; Weimar 1959) 566 
line 20-24; Die Urkunden Friderici I. 1158-1167, ed. Heinrich Appelt  MGH, 
DD 10.2; Hannover 1979) 127 line 46-128 lines 1-3. 
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terminology is widespread and did cross the channel, as we have 
seen, in literary texts.  What did the listeners understand by ‘leal 
jugement’ when they heard the story of Reynard the Fox?  I 
would argue that the phrase did not conjure up an image of the 
ordeal. 
 There can be no question a ‘legale iudicium’ was con-
sidered an alternative to the ordeal in the imperial privileges.  
What mode of proof might a ‘legale iudicium’ be?   Henry III’s 
privilege stated that any case impinging upon the rights of the 
privilege could be settled only in his palace but gave no details 
about the procedure that should be used.42    One clue might be in 
a privilege of 997 in which Emperor Otto III had stipulated that 
an ordeal could not be used to settle a dispute about the rights of 
an abbey but rather could be decided by oaths of ‘two or three 
men’.43 
 Can we conclude that in chapter 39 the English barons 
petitioned King John to be judged by a mode of proof that was 
not an ordeal?  If they did, does chapter 39 preclude the ordeal?  
The final clause ‘o par la lei de la terre (vel per legem terre)’ 
does not permit a definitive answer.44  The ‘lex terrae’ could 
mean the ordeal.  Holt points out the French translator interpreted 
‘vel’ as ‘or’ not ‘and’, a grammatical dispute of long-standing 
42 Die Urkunden Heinrichs III. 167: ‘Statuimus ut ante cuiuslibet potestatem 
nullatenus finiatur nisi in palacio nostro’, preceded the boiler plate quoted in 
n. 25 above. 
43 Die Urkunden Otto des III. ed. Theodor Sickel (MGH, DD 2; Hannover: 
Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1893) 655 lines 15-20e:  ‘Si autem quod sepissime 
contingere non dubium est evenerit, ut ex rebus abbatie contentio incrementa 
ceperit super quibus vero cartarum auctoritas igne aut aliqua negligentie 
occasione consumpta in presentiarum ostendi nequiverit, convessive largimur 
ut licitum sit predicte abbatie nostra auctoritate ut non duello aut aliquo 
defensionis iuditio sed solummodo duorum vel trium hominum iuramento 
finiatur’.  cf. Hermann Nottarp, Gottesurteilstudien (Bamberger 
Abhandlungen und Forschungen 2; Munich, Im Kösel Verlag, 1956) 140;  See 
Dominique Barthélemy, ‘Les ordalies de l’an mil’, La justice en l’an mil 
(Collection Histoire de la Justice 15; Paris: Association Française pour 
l’Histoire de la Justice, 2003) 81-92. 
44 Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta’ 356-357. 
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among scholars.45  The translator’s choice is weighty if not 
conclusive evidence to the syntax of ‘vel’.  The meaning of ‘lex 
terrae’ will probably never be adequately explained, especially in 
the context of chapter 39, where the phrase might have meant the 
ordeal was an alternative mode of proof.  In any case I do not 
think ‘lex terrae’ could mean judgment.46 
 The most intriguing evidence is  at the end of the charter 
in chapters 52 and 57, where the formula ‘senz leal judgement de 
ses pers (sine legali iudicio parium suorum)’ is stipulated for 
disputes over property and rights but an alternative of ‘per legem 
terre’ is not given. Holt assumes that the French translator made 
a mistake in chapter 52 when he wrote ‘real jugement’ instead of 
‘leal jugement’.47   Holt made no comment about the variant.  It 
is a simple mistake if we assume the translator worked 
mechanically.  As we have seen, he did not.  That the translator 
meant to write royal judgment is certainly not out of the question 
and has implications for our questions about procedure.  Perhaps 
we should think about ‘real jugement’ a bit more.  Royal 
judgment would certainly not be an ordeal.  In the end, however, 
we are left with uncertainty whether the barons had misgivings 
about the ordeal as a mode of proof.  If they did, the issue was 
joined a few months after Runnymede.  In November 1215 the 
Fourth Lateran Council under Pope Innocent III definitively 
forbade clerics from participating in the ordeal in canon 18, 
Sententiam sanguinis.  Chapter 39 applied to John’s kingdom; 
Lateran canon 18 to every person in Christendom.   
 Richard Helmholz has written that chapter 40 is also 
‘very hard to understand’.48  He points out that if the text is taken 
literally it does not make sense in the context of English law.  In 
England and elsewhere taking a case to court was expensive.  He 
argues that if one places the ideas of chapter 40 in the context of 
45 Holt, ‘French Vernacular Magna Carta’ 350.  For the controversies 
surrounding chapter 39, see Holt, Magna Carta 226-228 (3rd ed. 2015) 276-
278. 
46 See Summerson, n.20 above.  Cf. Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’ 833. 
47 Holt, ‘French Vernacular Magna Carta’ 361. 
48 Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta’ 340-342. 
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the Ius commune, the chapter is in concord with the 
jurisprudence of the time.  There are English legal historians who 
have criticized Helmholz’ conclusions about the Ius commune 
and Magna Carta, but I think they have not understood his 
primary point.49  Helmholz has not argued that some of the 
provisions of Magna Carta were taken directly from the Ius 
commune nor that they might not have been buttressed by the 
legal thought and norms of prior English law.  Rather, he argued 
that ideas and concepts of various chapters were very much part 
of European jurisprudence, that is the Ius commune, at the time 
the charter was drafted.  In only a few cases, as has been noted 
many times, did the drafters of Magna Carta incorporate the 
vocabulary of the Ius commune into the charter.  No one disputes 
the fact that the charter incorporated canon law, and its language 
(e.g. ‘libertas ecclesiae’) which was a key part of the Ius 
commune.  Consequently, we must not assume that the learned 
men who helped the barons draft Magna Carta left their learning 
aside as the charter was composed.   The language that the 
drafters used is a clue to their sources but so are their ideas and 
concepts.  That is the point Helmholz wished to make.50 
 
Chapter 40 of Magna Carta reads: 
<40> A nulli ne vendrons, a nullui n'escondirons, ne ne 
porloignerons dreit ne justice (Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut 
differemus rectum aut iusticiam).  To no one will we sell, to no one 
will we deny or delay right or justice. 
49 John Hudson, ‘Magna Carta, the Ius commune, and English Common Law’, 
Magna Carta and the England of King John, ed. Janet S. Loengard 
(Woodbridge 2010) 97-119.  For an even more forceful argument, which I 
will touch upon below, see Thomas J. McSweeney, ‘Magna Carta, Civil Law, 
and Canon Law’, Magna Carta and the Rule of Law, edd. Daniel B. Magraw, 
A. Martinez, and R. Brownell (Chicago 2014) 281-309.  David Carpenter has 
been open to see the influence of the Ius commune, e.g.  David Carpenter, 
Magna Carta, with a new Commentary (London 2015) 262. 
50 Richard Helmholz made that point in an email to me: ‘<it was a> common 
the habit was among English lawyers of using a different word for what was 
clearly a borrowing from the ius commune.  It is something of a leit-motif in 
English legal history.  E.g., novel disseisin for the possessory interdicts, 
slander for defamation’. 
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As Helmholz could not, I cannot solve the larger problems 
connected with the difficulty of understanding chapter 40.  I shall 
concentrate on one word, ‘rectum’ that the French translator 
rendered as ‘dreit’.  If one had asked any translator to render 
‘dreit’ back into Latin in another text, he would have 
undoubtedly have written ‘ius’.   No jurist of the Ius commune 
would have used ‘rectum’ in the way it is used in Magna Carta.  
They used the word to describe what was proper or correct, i.e. 
‘rectus ordo’, ‘rectum ius’, ‘rectum iudicium’, or as an adverb 
meaning ‘properly’ or ‘correctly’.  As we have seen in chapter 38 
with the word ‘fidelis’, the French translator knew that the 
correct word should be ‘ius’, which would be ‘dreit’ in French.  
‘Ius’ and ‘iustitia’ were found together in ancient and medieval 
Roman law and in the Ius commune until the end of its sway.  It 
would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the terms were 
inseparable in the thought of medieval jurists.  The first title of 
book one in both Justinian’s Institutes and his Digest begin ‘De 
iustitia et iure’.51  Every person who had ever had the slightest 
brush with the Ius commune knew the famous maxim in the 
Digest, ‘Justice is the constant and unbending will to render 
everyone his right (Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius 
suum cuique tribuendi’, Dig. 1.2.10)’.  The French translator 
knew it too. 
 To be clear, I am not arguing that the French translator 
took the language of ‘ius et iustitia’ directly from Justinian’s 
Digest.  Helmholz makes the point that if we look at Magna 
Carta from a European perspective we find that the same issues 
appear in continental law, both in the local legal systems — the 
‘iura propria’ in the language of the jurists — and in the Ius 
commune.  The influences and the borrowings may be direct or 
indirect — it is often difficult to determine in the age before 
Bracton — but they are there.  A few years ago I tried to make 
the same point with Magna Carta’s chapter 9.52   This is how the 
French translator handled the rather complicated text: 
51 Instit. 1.1 and Dig. 1.1; cf. Dig. 47.9.10. 
52 Pennington, ‘The Ius commune, Suretyship, and Magna carta’, RIDC 11 
(2000) 255-274. 
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<9> Ne nos ne nostre bailli ne seiseron terre ne rente del dettor por 
aucune dette, tandis com sis chatels soffisent a paier la dette, ne si 
plege ne seront destroit, tant dis come le chevetaigne dettor soffira a 
la dette paier. Et se le chevetaigne detor n’a de quei paier sa dette, 
respoigne li plege de la dette; e s'il volent, aient les terres e les rentes 
del dettor jusqu'il aient restorement de la dette qu'il ont devant paiee 
por lui, se le chevetaigne detor ne monstre qu'il en est quite vers cels 
pleges (Nec nos nec ballivi nostri seisiemus terram aliquam nec 
redditum pro debito aliquo, quamdiu catalla debitoris sufficiunt ad 
debitum reddendum; nec plegii ipsius debitoris distringantur quamdiu 
ipse capitalis debitor sufficit ad solucionem debiti; et si capitalis 
debitor defecerit in solucione debiti, non habens unde solvat, plegii 
respondeant de debito; et, si voluerint, habeant terras et redditus 
debitoris, donec sit eis satisfactum de debito quod ante pro eo 
solverint, nisi capitalis debitor monstraverit se esse quietum inde 
versus eosdem plegios).  Neither we nor our bailiffs shall seize any 
land or rent for any debt, so long as the chattels of the debtor are 
sufficient to repay the debt; nor shall the sureties of the debtor be 
distained so long as the principal debtor is able to satisfy the debt; 
and if the principal debtor shall fail to pay the debt, having nothing 
with which to pay it, then the sureties shall answer for the debt; and 
let them have the lands and rents of the debtor, if they desire them, 
until they are indemnified for the debt which they have paid for him, 
unless the principal debtor can show that he is discharged of it as 
against the said sureties. 
‘Debitor’ reflects the language of the Ius commune.  
Linguistically, it is a puzzle why the drafters used ‘plegius’ and 
not the technical term ‘fideiussor’.  Maybe the puzzle is not that 
difficult to solve.  English legal documents before 1215 always 
used the term ‘plegius’ rather than ‘fideiussor’.  David Trotter 
has recently given us illustrated examples of the practice.53  
Magna Carta was written for the English not for Europe.  The 
French translator did give us one very interesting piece of 
evidence in chapter 40.  The text of Magna Carta specifies that 
the debtor was the ‘capitalis debitor’.  This wording is intriguing.  
In the Ius commune the adjective ‘capitalis’ was used in criminal 
law to describe a deadly or hostile enemy or very serious 
53 David Trotter, ‘ ‘Stuffed Latin’:  Vernacular Evidence in Latin Documents’, 
Language and Culture in Medieval Britain:  The French of England, c.1100-
1500, ed. Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, Maryanne Kowaleski et al. (York 2013) 
153-163 at 158-159 
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crimes.54  It never meant ‘principal’, as it was used in Magna 
Carta.  When confronted with ‘capitalis debitor’ in Magna Carta 
chapter 40, the French translator made a revealing change that 
may again indicate that he knew the jurisprudence of the Ius 
commune better than the drafters of the Latin charter.  He 
understood that he could not use a French version of ‘capitalis’ if 
he were to accurately convey the meaning of the phrase.  
Therefore he translated ‘capitalis debitor’ as ‘chevetaigne 
det(t)or’.  ‘Chevetaigne’ meant ‘chief’, ‘lord’, or ‘principal in 
medieval French’.55  In the thirteenth century, ‘Bracton’ 
employed ‘capitalis’ both ways.  He used the term most 
frequently to describe a principal feudal lord, court, residence, or 
justiciar and less often to define a serious crime, ‘felonia’ and 
‘crimen’.56   
 Helmholz made two points about this chapter.  First, this 
chapter was not included in the reissue of Magna Carta in 1225.  
We have no way to know if it was enforced between 1215 and 
1225.  Second, ancient Roman law permitted creditors to hold 
sureties responsible if the principal debtor became insolvent.  A 
Novella of Justinian changed the norm to that adopted by Magna 
Carta.  The debtor must be insolvent before the sureties could be 
sued for the principal’s debt.57   
 Helmholz noted that the language of chapter nine showed 
no trace of Justinian’s Novella.  The argument that he, quoting 
McKechnie, put forward was, since there was no precedent in 
English law for the rule, protecting sureties ‘found favour in 
54 ‘Capitalis’ was attached to ‘inimicitia’, ‘crimen’, ‘iudicium’, ‘causa’, 
‘fraus’, and ‘delictum;’ cf. Justinian’s Institutes 1.25.11, 2.20.31, 3.3.11, and 
4.18.2.   
55 For the use of the word in medieval French, see Paul-Friedrich Bernitt, Lat. 
caput und *capum nebst inren Wortsippen im Französischen: Ein Beitrag zur 
französischen bezw. romanischen Wortgeschichte (Kiel 1905) 27-31, 37, 41-
42, 161-164. 
56 Bracton attached ‘capitalis’ meaning principal several hundred times to 
‘dominus’, and also to ‘mesuagium (residence)’, ‘felonia’, ‘crimen’, 
‘placitum’, ‘manerium’, ‘iustitiarius’, and ‘curia’. 
57 Novella 4.3.1; Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta’ 319. 
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most systems of jurisprudence’.58  I extended Helmholz’ analysis 
and demonstrated that this equitable solution to the relationship 
between a principal debtor and his sureties became generally 
accepted in the Ius commune and in the various European ‘iura 
propria’.59 
 Thomas McSweeney has recently taken up the problems 
of chapter nine.60  He offered this translation of the main text of 
Justinian’s Novella:61 
If anyone shall have loaned money and accepted a fideiussor, a 
mandator, or a sponsor, he should not first proceed against the 
mandator or fideiussor, or sponsor, and he should not molest the 
intercessors of the debtor as a negligent person, but he should come 
first to him who took the money and contracted the debt. 
The translation has a flaw.  ‘He should not molest the 
intercessors of the debtor as a negligent person’ does not make 
sense in English and betrays the Latin.  It should be ‘and the fault 
of the debtor may not be injurious to the sureties’.   ‘Intercessor’ 
is a general word in Roman law that encompasses the various 
types of sureties.   Sweeney assumes that Helmholz thinks the 
drafters of Magna Carta would have taken their ideas directly 
from Justinian’s Novella.  That assumption is extremely unlikely.  
First, Helmholz did not assert that.  He said only that the rule in 
Justinian’s Novella became a norm in the Ius commune.  Second, 
the text of the Novella circulated in medieval guise as a part of 
the Authenticum, but the Authenticum did not circulate widely.  It 
is very unlikely that the drafters of Magna Carta would have 
access to a copy of the Authenticum.62     If he had written about 
the possibility of transmission, which he did not, Helmholz 
58 Ibid. 
59 Pennington, ‘The Ius commune, Suretyship, and Magna carta’, RIDC 11 
(2000) 255-274. 
60 McSweeny, ‘Magna Carta’ 287-291.  
61 Ibid. 288: Nov. 4.1.1 ‘Si quis igitur crediderit et fideiussorem aut 
mandatorem aut sponsorem acceperit, is non primum mox adversus 
mandatorem aut fideiussorem aut sponsorem accedat, neque neglegens 
debitoris intercessoribus molestus sit, sed veniat primum ad eum, qui aurum 
accepit debitumque contraxit’. 
62 See Hermann Lange, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter, 1: Die Glossatoren 
(München 1997) 82-85. 
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would have argued that the drafters of Magna Carta took the 
norm from the summaries of Novellae that were found in the 
margins of twelfth-century manuscripts of Justinian’s Codex.  
These texts were attributed to Irnerius but were added to the 
Codex by many other jurists during the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.  They were called ‘constitutiones novae’ or 
‘authenticae’ by the medieval jurists.63  Their purpose was to up-
date the texts in the Codex.  If we want to speculate about how 
the norm contained in the Novella entered Magna Carta, we 
have to examine the margins of the numerous Codex manuscripts 
that circulated widely in England that was attached to the short 
and cryptic constitution of the Emperor Antoninus of 213 A.D.:64 
Iure nostro est potestas creditori relicto reo eligendi fideiussores, nisi 
inter contrahentes aliud placitum doceatur.  By our authority the 
power is given to the creditor of choosing sureties if he has been 
abandoned by the debtor, unless the contract among the parties 
stipulates otherwise. 
This was the norm in ancient Roman law.  The medieval teachers 
of Roman law, possibly Irnerius, summarized Justinian’s 
legislation and placed this text next to Antoninus’ constitution.65 
Presente tamen utroque non permittitur intercessorem convenire 
priusquam reus inventus est minus idoneus in totum sive in partem.  
Absente autem reo presens intercessor iure quidem convenitur; ipso 
tamen desiderante iudex definiet tempus intra quod deducat reum 
primo conveniendum, ipso in subsidium reservando.  Nam transacto 
tempore compellitur intercessor satisfacere, cessis sibi a creditore 
actionibus, absque distinctione  contractus sive intercessionis.  If both 
the debtor and the sureties are present the creditor may not summon 
the sureties before the debtor is found to be less worthy (i.e. failed in 
his fiduciary responsibilities) totally or partially.  If, however, the 
debtor is absent, a surety who is present can, indeed, be convened.  
Nevertheless, if the surety asks, the judge will set a time within 
which the debtor may be convened first, with duty of the surety being 
held in reserve.  If that time period has passed, the surety is 
compelled to satisfy the debt without reference to contract or to a 
63 Pennington, ‘The Beginning of Roman Law Jurisprudence and Teaching in 
the Twelfth Century:  The Authenticae’, RIDC 22 (2012) 35-53. 
64 Cod. 8.40(41).5. 
65 Stuttgart, Landesbibliothek 71, fol. 162rb, Vienna, ÖNB lat. 2267, fol. 187r, 
and Paris, BNF lat. 1691, fol. 185r; every twelfth-century Codex I have seen 
has this authentica in the margin. 






116 KEN PENNINGTON 
 
veto, the creditors’ court actions having been exhausted against the 
debtor.  
This is the text that the drafters of Magna Carta would have had 
in mind if they were borrowing directly from Roman law.   If one 
compares the authentica Presente to chapter nine, it is clear that 
the contents of the texts in the two documents are much more 
closely related to each other than the original text of the Novella 




If both the debtor and the sureties are 
present the creditor may not summon 
the sureties before the debtor is found 
to be less worthy (i.e. failed in his 
fiduciary responsibilities) totally or 
partially.  If, however, the debtor is 
absent, a surety who is present can, 
indeed, be convened.  Nevertheless, if 
the surety asks, the judge may set a 
time within which the debtor may be 
convened first, with the surety being 
held in reserve.  If that time period 
has passed, the surety is compelled to 
satisfy the debt without reference to 
contract or to a veto, the creditors’ 
court actions having been exhausted 




Magna Carta c. 9 
 
Neither we nor our bailiffs shall seize 
any land or rent for any debt, so long 
as the chattels of the debtor are 
sufficient to repay the debt; nor shall 
the sureties of the debtor be distained 
so long as the principal debtor is able 
to satisfy the debt; and if the principal 
debtor shall fail to pay the debt, 
having nothing with which to pay it, 
then the sureties shall answer for the 
debt; and let them have the lands and 
rents of the debtor, if they desire 
them, until they are indemnified for 
the debt which they have paid for 
him, unless the principal debtor can 
show that he is discharged of it as 
against the said sureties. 
 
I am not arguing that we can be certain the authentica Presente 
was a source for the drafters of chapter nine.  I would argue that 
we cannot preclude the possibility.66  However, one may justi-
66 McSweeney, ‘Magna Carta’ 288-291, when comparing chapter 9 to 
Justinian’s legislation asserts ‘The format is markedly different’.  His points 
about the differences cannot be sustained when comparing chapter 9 to 
Presente.  It is particularly difficult to understand the point of his comparison 
of chapter 9 with Bracton and his concluding remark on p. 191 that 
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fiably wonder whether any of the drafters looked at an 
intimidating copy of a glossed manuscript of Justinian’s Codex.  
There were other avenues to the text, because Presente circulated 
in England and Northern France through other sources.  The 
most probable was through Vacarius’ Liber pauperum, in which 
Presente was added to the margin of the Worchester Cathedral 
Library manuscript.67  These summaries and adaptations of 
Justinian’s legislation were major sources of law during the 
twelfth century, and their inclusion in Liber pauperum underlines 
their significance.  155 other ‘authenticae’ were also included in 
the manuscripts of the Liber pauperum.68  They even circulated 
separately from the Codex.  Perhaps a revealing connection of 
Rouen to the Ius commune in Norman circles is the collection of 
‘authenticae’ that included Presente in a Parisian manuscript.69  
These texts were considered important guides to the twelfth-
century norms on many different points of private law.  Franck 
Roumy has conjectured that the collection of ‘authenticae’ was 
put together for Normandy by the entourage of the learned 
Norman archbishop of Rouen, and former bishop of Lincoln, 
Gautier de Coutances between 1185 and 1207, who had been 
acting English justiciar until 1193 when Hubert Walter was 
<Bracton’s text> demonstrates what Magna Carta could have looked like had 
it been written by the ‘ius commune’s true believers’.  More on that point at 
the end of this essay. 
67 The Liber Pauperum of Vacarius, ed. Francis de Zulueta (Selden Society 
44;  London 1927) 271.  David Carpenter assumes that Vacarius was used and 
read in England, see Carpenter, Magna Carta 267.  He also assumes that ‘The 
tendency of legal teaching in England .  .  . was to play down the absolutist 
elements in Roman law’.  Although scholars still assert otherwise, the jurists 
of the Ius commune did not embrace the absolutism of texts in Roman law that 
would have supported it, e.g. the classic study of  Brian Tierney, ‘The Prince 
is Not Bound by the Law: Accursius and the Origins of the Modern State’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 (1963) 378-400 and my The 
Prince and the Law 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal 
Tradition (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993) 30-37 
and passim. 
68 Ibid. lvii-lxvii.  On Vacarius and his importance in England, see Jason 
Taliadoros, Law and Theology in Twelfth-Century England: The Works of 
Master Vacarius: (1115/20-c.1200)  (Disputatio, 10. Turnhout 2006).  
69 Paris, BNF lat. 3922A, fol.209rb-fol. 210ra. 
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appointed justiciar.70   This collection is one more avenue down 
which Presente could have come to the attention of those who 
drafted Magna Carta. 
 Comparing the French translator’s work to the texts of the 
chapters where the drafters of Magna Carta used the language of 
the Ius commune yields interesting and, as we have seen, 
contradictory results.  In chapter one, at the very beginning of the 
charter, the English church was granted ‘her full rights and her 
unimpaired (or uninjured) liberties (iura sua integra et libertates 
suas illesas)’.  These rights included ‘freedom of election 
(libertas electionum)’.  At the end of the chapter John promised 
that ‘he granted to all free men of our kingdom, on behalf of us 
and our heirs, in perpetuity, all the liberties below (Concessimus 
etiam omnibus liberis hominibus regni nostri, pro nobis et 
heredibus nostris in perpetuum, omnes libertates subscriptas)’.  
The French translator did not have a Latin cognate in French to 
translate ‘libertas’. ‘Liberté’ entered French only in the 
fourteenth century;  it entered English about the same time.71  
The proof of that generalization is the work of a gifted linguist 
who translated Gratian’s Decretum into French at the end of the 
twelfth century.  Gratian had included many texts including the 
word ‘libertas’.  The French translator of Gratian confronted the 
same problems as the translator of Magna Carta, but he never 
used ‘liberté’ or any of its cognates.    In legal Latin, ‘libertas’ 
meant a right but also meant freedom.  Although ‘libertas’ could 
mean ‘ius’ in certain contexts in the Ius commune, there was a 
significant difference between ‘ius’ and ‘libertas’ in their usual 
usage.  A ‘ius’ was a right to act justly and legally, while a 
‘libertas’ was freedom that was granted by a privilege, claim, or 
70 For other collections of ‘authenticae’ that circulated independently, see 
Franck Roumy, ‘Une collection inédite d’authenticae compose en Normandie 
à fin du XIIe siècle’, Novellae constitutiones:  L’ultima legislazione di 
Giustiniano tra Oriente e Occidente, da Triboniano a Savigny:  Atti del 
Convegno Internazionale, Teramo, 30-31 ottobre 2009, edd. Luca Loschiavo, 
Giovanna Mancini, Cristina Vano (Università degli Studi di Teramo, Collana 
della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza 20; Napoli 2011) 155-204, Gautier and 
Presente at 182 and 194. 
71 Chaucer, Canterbury Tales, Manciple’s Tale, line 174. 
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custom.  Gratian had texts in which one had to distinguish 
between a right and freedom.72  Two of Gratian’s most famous 
texts in which freedom would be the correct translation were 
Isidore of Seville’s ‘omnium una libertas’ and the other was a 
text of Pope Urban II that quoted 2 Corinthians 3:17, ‘ ubi 
Spiritus Dei, ibi libertas’.  The Gratian translator translated the 
first ‘et que tuit soient franc’, and the second ‘ou il Esperiz 
Damedieu est, ilec est franchise’.73  However, when Gratian 
concluded ‘His omnibus auctoritatibus laici excluduntur ab 
electione sacerdotum, atque iniunigitur eis necessitas obediendi, 
non libertas imperandi’ the translator rendered the last clause ‘et 
non pas franchise de commander’.74  The translation does convey 
the correct meaning, but without the nuance that ‘liberté’ would 
have provided him. 
 The translator of Magna Carta had to deal with ‘libertas’ 
twelve times.  For the rights of the English churches in chapter 
one he wrote: ‘seront franches, e ainet lor dreitures franches e 
enterines e plenieres (they shall be free and have their free rights, 
entire and full)’.  He translated ‘ius’ as ‘dreit’, as he had in c.40.  
However, instead of acknowledging John’s promise to leave the 
liberties, that is rights, of the English church uninjured, the 
translator opted to write only that the rights would remain entire 
and full.  His formulation for free ecclesiastical elections was a 
challenge. For ‘libertas electionum’ the translator settled for ‘les 
franchises des ellections’.  The reading does not convey exactly 
the same meaning.  ‘Franchise’ would be a grant of a right or the 
freedom to elect, but ‘libertas’ would be the church’s right to 
72 See Charles Reid, Jr. Power over the Body, Equality in the Family: Rights 
and Domestic Relations in Medieval Canon Law (Emory University Studies in 
Law and Religion;  Grand Rapids, Michigan-Cambridge 2004) 18-20 but 
especially his ‘The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition: 
An Historical Inquiry’, Boston College Law Review 33 (1991) 37-92 at 64-67. 
73 Gratiani Decretum: La traduction en ancien français du Décret de Gratien, 
Vol. 1: Distinctiones. Vol. 2: Causae 1-14.  Vol. 3: Causae 15-29.  Vol. 4: 
Causae 30-36 et De consecratione, ed. Leena Löfstedt (Commentationes 
Humanarum Litterarum, 95, 99, 105, 110;  Helsinki 1992-1996) 1.5  and 3.78, 
Gratian, D.1 c.7 and C.19 q.2 c.2. 
74 Ibid. 1.143. 
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hold an election.  The difference is significant.  Finally, at the 
end of the chapter when John granted all freemen all their 
liberties (omnes libertates) in the charter, the translator rendered 
the phrase ‘totes les franchises’.  As with ‘libertas electionum’ an 
explanation might be, that I put forward tentatively, a ‘franchise’ 
was a grant of a right, where a ‘libertas’ could be possessed 
independently by the person or institution.  ‘Libertas ecclesiae’ 
had been a fundamental concept of ecclesiastical legal and 
theological thought since the pontificate of Pope Gregory VII.75  
Neither Gregory nor his successors thought ‘libertas ecclesiae’ 
was a franchise from a human ruler.  It was a right, ‘libertas’ as a 
‘ius’.  A royalist translator who was concerned to protect royal 
prerogatives might very well have considered ‘franchise’ to be 
better suited for a translation of ‘libertas’, particularly if he were 
aware of the equivocal meaning of ‘libertas’ in the Ius commune.  
In any case the translator was consistent.  ‘Libertas’ occurs 
twelve times in Magna Carta.  The translator used ‘franchise’ to 
translate ‘libertas’ each time.76  However, the translator’s 
linguistic choices were limited, and I do not think that we cannot 
draw any definitive conclusions from his choices.  Ironically for 
the concord of liberties in the Anglo-Norman French Kingdom of 
England, ‘liberté’ did not yet exist in French.   
 Back to Rouen.  Magna Carta and the IV Lateran canons 
occupy adjoining but separate quires at the end of the Rouen 
manuscript.77  The first question that confronts us is: why did 
these Anglo-Norman monks put these two documents together?78  
75 The literature is enormous treating ‘libertas ecclesiae’,  the essays collected 
in the series Studi Gregoriani per la storia della ‘Libertas ecclesiae’ (3 vols. 
Rome 1970-1989) are the best introduction to the subject. 
76 Chapters 1, 13, 52, 56, 59, 60, 61, 63. 
77 Rouen, BM lat. Y 200; see Mesmin (later MacDougall), The Leper Hospital 
of Saint Gilles, IV, Description of manuscript 1.162-165,  IV Lateran 2.342, 
Magna Carta: 2.359 
78 I have not been able to find a connection between St. Gilles and any English 
institutions; cf  Nicholas Vincent, ‘The English Monasteries and their French 
Possessions’, Cathedrals, Communities and Conflict in the Anglo-Norman 
World, ed. Paul Dalton, Charles Insley and Louis J. Wilkinson (Studies in the 
History of Medieval Religion 38; Woodbridge: Boydell, 2011) 221-240. 
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The monks would have obviously wanted to have copies of the 
conciliar canons as soon as they were promulgated.  Magna 
Carta began with a sturdy defense of the rights and freedoms of 
the English church.   That would have pleased them.  Paleogra-
phically, the two texts share interesting characteristics that shed 
some light on their origins.  Both texts were written in 
professional scriptoria and were meant to be more than fair 
copies whose use would be temporary.  The proof of that 
statement is that in both texts the initial letter of each 
canon/chapter was left blank, with space for an appropriate 
colored initial.  In both cases none were provided.  The reason 
was probably simple.  The leper hospital did not have a 
scriptorium.  However, both copies must have come from an 
institution with a sophisticated scriptorium.  The IV Lateran 
canons were formatted as a typical legal text with two columns.79  
The text of the IV Lateran canons is in a Northern French book 
hand, while Magna Carta is written by a typical chancery hand 
of the early thirteenth century.   A striking characteristic of the 
Magna Carta’s vernacular scribe is that he employed very few 
abbreviations.  Minimizing the number of abbreviations would 
have made the document easier to read for its intended 
audience.80  It would also support the assumption that many 
copies of the French Magna Carta were sent to all the recipients 
of the Latin text.  We have only the Rouen text, but I think it is 
improbable that a text of its quality, both the French and the 
written text, would have been unique.  If it were not unique, it 
must have been duplicated many times.  Only the number of 
surviving copies is unique: Rouen. 
79 The Rouen manuscript omitted two canons from its text, c.56 that dealt with 
tithes and c.71 in which Innocent called for a new crusade.  C.71 is omitted in 
another manuscript and shortened in 4 others.  Canons are out of place in 9 
other manuscripts.  It is difficult to draw any conclusions about c.56 and c.71 
having been omitted. 
80 Albert Derolez, The Palaeography of Gothic Manuscript Books:  From the 
Twelfth to the Early Sixteenth Century (Cambridge Studies in Palaeography 
and Codicology; Cambridge 2003) 187, observes ‘it is not surprising that 
vernacular manuscripts contain only a small quantity of abbreviations’. 
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 Magna Carta and the IV Lateran canons shared a spirit of 
reform.  Pope Innocent III sent a papal bull, Vineam domini 
Sabaoth, to every prelate in Christendom on April 19, 1213 in 
which he summoned them to attend a ‘general’ council in Rome 
during November of 2015.81  In his letter the pope had 
emphasized that reforms must be made in the Church and that a 
new crusade to the Holy Land must be launched.  If we take the 
program in Vineam domini Sabaoth as a guide to Innocent’s 
agenda, what he wanted in 1213 was reform of the Church, 
combating vices and reforming mores, stamping out of heresy — 
settling discord and establishing peace and fostering liberty.82   
 Magna Carta’s drafters were concerned with procedure 
in chapters 38-40 and so were the jurists who surrounded 
Innocent III.  Canon 18 forbade clerics to shed blood and ordered 
them not to participate in ordeals.  Canon eight established the 
rules for inquisitorial modes of proof.  This new procedure 
offered an alternative to accusatorial procedure, which required 
that an accuser was essential to a criminal trial.  Inquisitorial 
procedure granted a judge the authority to investigate 
wrongdoing and summon defendants to his court.83  It laid out 
81 The Latin text is printed and translated in Selected Letters of Pope Innocent 
III 144-147.  See also Paul B. Pixton, The German Episcopacy and the 
Implementation of the Decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1216-1245:  
Watchmen on the Tower (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 64; 
Leiden-New York-Köln 1995) 1-3.  A ‘generale concilium’ meant a papal 
council, see Atria A. Larson, ‘Early Stages of Gratian’s Decretum and the 
Second Lateran Council: A Reconsideration’,  BMCL 27 (2007) 21-56 at 28-
36. 
82 Cheney and Semple, Selected Letters 145: ‘convocemus propter .  .  .  
extirpanda vitia et plantandas virtutes, corrigendos excessus, et refomandos 
mores .  .  . sopiendas discordias et stabiliendam pacem, comprimendas 
oppressions et libertatem fovendam’. 
83 Winfried Trusen,  ‘Der Inquisitionsprozeß: Seine historischen Grundlagen 
und frühen Formen’,  ZRG Kan. Abt. 74 (1988) 168-230; Trusen,  ‘Das 
Verbot der Gottesurteile und der Inquisitionsprozeß: Zum Wandel des 
Strafverfahrens unter dem Einfluß des gelehrten Rechts im 
Spätmittelalter’, Sozialer Wandel im Mittelalter: Wahrnehmungsformen, 
Erklärungsmuster, Regelungs-mechanismen, ed. Jürgen Miethke und Klaus 
Schreiner (Sigmaringen 1994) 235-247; Richard M. Fraher, ‘IV Lateran 
Revolution in Criminal Procedure:  The Birth of Inquisitio, the End of 
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the qualities that witnesses must possess similar to Magna 
Carta’s chapter 38.  Canon 35 dealt with the rules for appeal; 
canon 36 forbade  appeals from interlocutory decisions; canon 37 
declared that  defendants should not be burdened by excessive 
summons of witnesses more than two days distant without the 
agreement of both parties; one of the most important was canon 
38 that stipulated all the proceedings of a trial must be recorded 
in writing.    
 ‘Fostering ‘libertas’ was on Innocent’s mind when he 
summoned the council in 1213, but the word appears only twice 
in the canons.  Canon 25 warned secular authorities that they 
should not interfere in elections contrary to ‘canonica libertas’.  
King John granted the same rights to the English church in 
chapter one.  The Council warned secular rulers not to legislate 
against the exemptions enjoyed by ecclesiastical ‘libertas’.  This 
is a good example of the equivocal meanings ‘libertas’ could 
have.  One could translate ‘libertas’ in this canon as right, 
freedom, or franchise. 
 To return in conclusion to Charles Donahue’s ‘influence’ 
of the Ius commune.  I have tried to demonstrate the sometimes 
contradictory ‘influences’ of the Ius commune and continental 
law on Magna Carta.  Those scholars who have been skeptical of 
Helmholz’ attempts to see connections and influences have 
tended to understand law in the early thirteenth century as being 
the same Balkanized systems of positive law and jurisprudence 
that exists today.  McSweeney is the most extreme.84  He has 
Ordeals, and Innocent III's Vision of Ecclesiastical Politics’,  Studia in 
honorem Eminentissimi Cardinalis Alfonsi M. Stickler, ed. Rosalio Iosepho 
Card. Castillo Lara (Studia et Textus Historiae Iuris Canonici 7; Rome 1992) 
97-111, was his last word on the subject;  he cited his earlier essays in his 
notes. 
84 A much more reasoned and balanced, if negative, discussion of the issue is 
found in Holt, Magna Carta (3rd ed.) 15-25, by Garnett and Hudson.  On p. 15 
n.81 they record a conversation between Christopher R. Cheney and Holt as 
being ‘particularly authoritative’ since Cheney had not seen any connection 
between canon law and Magna Carta.  Cheney was a brilliant historian of the 
Church; it does his memory no disservice to say, as he said to me more than 
once, that he was not a historian of medieval canonical jurisprudence.  He had 
even less interest in the jurisprudence of medieval Roman law. 
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written ‘If among the drafters of Magna Carta there were any of 
the ius commune’s true believers, they did not leave their mark’ 
and Bracton ‘demonstrates what Magna Carta could have looked 
like had it been written by the ius commune’s true believers’.85  
The Ius commune was not a religion.  It did not have believers.  It 
did have teachers, students, and practitioners.  Every law school 
of Europe taught it, and this universal, homogeneous training is 
how the Ius commune gained its dominance over European 
jurisprudence.  If we had a uniform system of law schools today 
that had the same curriculum, taught the same books, employed 
the same language in their books and lectures, and used the same 
teaching methodology, we would have the same institutional 
structure that produced the Ius commune.  When law students 
went back to practice law in their local courts, they took their 
academic baggage with them.  None of these trained jurists 
thought of the law they had studied, had taught, had written 
about, or had practiced was in constant opposition to any other 
legal system.  They did think the Ius commune was a source for 
filling lacunae and shaping legal arguments.  Most pernicious, 
perhaps, is the modern concept prevalent in the scholarship that 
the Ius commune is ‘learned law’: bookish, cerebral, and alien to 
the rough and tumble of European courtrooms.86   It has been 
shown again and again that the practitioners in the courtroom and 
compilers of the iura propria took what they wanted to take from 
the Ius commune and left aside what they did not want or need.87 
 Most importantly, the Ius commune was a jurisprudence 
of norms, concepts, technical terms, and principles that shaped 
every legal system in Europe to varying degrees from the twelfth 
to the seventeenth century.  In the twelfth century, when another 
Norman-French ruler, King Roger II of Sicily, ordered 
85 McSweeney, ‘Magna Carta’ 287 and 291. 
86 See my rather polemical essay ‘Learned Law, Droit Savant, Gelehrtes 
Recht: The Tyranny of a Concept’, RIDC 5 (1994) 197-209 and Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce 20 (1994) 205-215.   
87 The many works of Helmholz  and Donahue have been particularly relevant 
for illustrating the interaction of the Ius commune and English court decisions, 
e.g. Richard H. Helmholz, The Ius commune in England: Four Studies 
(Oxford 2001). 
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Bolognese jurists in his realm to compile a set of ‘constitutions’ 
in 1140 the jurisprudence of the Ius commune suffuses the entire 
work.  It would have not occurred to the jurists who compiled 
Roger’s legislation that they were betraying Sicilian or French 
customary legal traditions by clothing it in the language of 
Roman law.88  In England from the middle of the twelfth 
century, jurists trained in the schools of the Ius commune 
dominated ecclesiastical courts.89  For a brief time during the age 
of ‘Bracton’ it looked as if the Ius commune would become a part 
of English common law.   Its influence on statutory legislation of 
European cities is beyond question.  Manlio Bellomo 
characterized the relationship between the Ius commune some 
years ago as ‘like the Ptolemaic system in which the earth lay 
immobile at the center of a horizontal plane while the sun in its 
heavens moved around it every day, illuminating and warming 
it’.90  Bellomo’s metaphor is apt and fitting to define what 
Donahue meant by ‘influence’.  John Baldwin concluded his 
piece on Stephen Langton and Magna Carta with these words: 
‘Considered separately, these linkages may appear slight, but 
taken together they form a coherent picture’.91  Perhaps the 
picture in this essay is not completely coherent, but in honor of 
John’s memory I use his words to conclude my essay.  
 
The Catholic University of America. 
88 See my ‘The Birth of the Ius commune:  King Roger II=s Legislation’, RIDC 
17 (2006) 1-40. 
89 The literature on this point is large; most recently see James A. Brundage, 
‘The Managerial Revolution in the English Church’, Magna Carta and the 
England of King John, ed. Janet S. Loengard (Woodbridge 2010) 83-98. 
90 Manlio Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000-1800 (Studies in 
Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law, 4; Washington D.C. 1995) 192. 
91 Baldwin († February 8,  2015), ‘Master Stephen Langton’ 846. 
                                                         
